Abstract
Scoring auctions are important mechanisms for procurement in both developed and developing countries. Till date the literature has mainly dealt with cases where the scoring rule is quasilinear. Very few papers in the literature have dealt with non-quasilinear scoring rules. In chapter 4 we fill this gap. Under some conditions we derive a clear ranking of the expected scores in first-score and second-score auctions. We show how in many cases second price auctions lead to higher expected score. We show with the help of two examples, that while expected score may be higher with second-score auctions, total expected welfare need not be higher.
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