Abstract
Private database query (PDQ) is a protocol between a client and a database server, designed for processing queries to encrypted databases. Specifically, PDQ enables a client to submit a search query and to learn a resulting set satisfying its search condition, without revealing sensitive information about a query statement. The whole query can be protected from the server, but for efficiency reasons known PDQ solutions generally consider to hide the constants only in a query statement. In this paper, we provide two fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)-based PDQ protocols that hide type of queries as well as the constants of a query statement. Particularly, our constructions focus on conjunctive, disjunctive, and threshold conjunctive queries. To this end, we first build a single compact logical expression to cover both conjunctive and disjunctive queries. On top of the logical expression, we design a PDQ protocol that enables to evaluate conjunctive and disjunctive queries without revealing any information on a given query. The second PDQ protocol comes from our observation that if a threshold conjunctive query has a particular threshold value, it results in either a conjunctive query or a disjunctive query. Because the PDQ protocol writes the three types of queries into a single polynomial expression, the resulting protocol can evaluate the three types of query statements without revealing any information on queries. To demonstrate their efficiency, we provide proof-of-concept implementation results of our proposed PDQ protocols. According to our rudimentary experiments, it takes 37.57 seconds to perform a query on 316 elements consisting of 16 attributes of 64 bits using Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan’s leveled FHE with SIMD techniques for 149-bit security, yielding an amortized rate of just 0.119 seconds per element.
Highlights
Cloud computing involves highly durable storage platforms supporting a wide scope of services
We present implementation results of our designs of private database query (PDQ) protocols
We will argue that the construction of our SCH-PDQ protocol in Section III-B hides the query structure as well as the query constant in a query statement Q, which implies that we can enhance the privacy of PDQ protocols
Summary
Cloud computing involves highly durable storage platforms supporting a wide scope of services. They face the privacy problem that affects outsourcing, maintaining the privacy of information; for those that are sensitive. This makes sense in personal uses of cloud database services as well. From the perspective of a client which has been storing data in the cloud, two key privacy challenges arise. A long history of client queries could allow the server to gradually learn the information in the encrypted database. We consider fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) since its capability of computing on encrypted data allows both non-aggregate (i.e., search) and aggregate query operations over encrypted databases. Before formalizing the second privacy problem, we consider a specific example. The example illustrates the essential features and motivations of our solution(s)
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