SDI and deterrence: A Western European perspective

Abstract

Abstract Many Western European critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) argue that ballistic missile defenses (BMD) will upset deterrence stability, promote crisis instability, increase the likelihood of conventional and/or limited nuclear war confined to Europe, and degrade the credibility of French and British nuclear deterrents. Underlying these criticisms is an approach to nuclear strategy that views mutual vulnerability as the sine qua non of deterrence. This analysis argues that not only is mutual vulnerability (or mutual deterrence) inconsistent with U.S. extended deterrence requirements, but such deterrence based on the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) has never guided U.S. or Soviet operational deterrence policy. By equating the term deterrence with assured destruction or mutual vulnerability, European critics of SDI preempt any sound analysis of the impact of BMD on deterrence stability. Indeed, it can be argued, even from a Western European perspective, that certain types of BMD deployments can strengthen the Alliance's ability to deter Soviet acts of aggression. Western European critics of SDI must also realize that instabilities resulting from defensive deployments must be viewed in the context of existing and future instabilities created by the continuing growth of Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities.