Thinking about the strategic defence initiative: an alliance perspective

Abstract

In his speech on 23 March 1983 announcing the strategic defence initiative (SDI), President Reagan sketched a picture of a future world in which security would be based on defensive capabilities rather than on the threat of nuclear war. He acknowledged the achievement of a strategy based on nuclear retaliation in preserving peace and security for thirty years, but he expressed the view that to continue to rely on that strategy was, at best, a bleak prospect and a sad commentary on the human condition and, at worst, a recipe for eventual nuclear conflict. Development of a capability to 'intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles', by contrast, would permit a shift in strategy from mutual assured destruction to mutual assured survival, and would 'free the world from the threat of nuclear war'. It is safe to assume that the President expected his vision to inspire hope and to command widespread support in the United States and around the world. Initial reactions, however, tended to dismiss the idea as hopelessly visionary and as further evidence of this President's inexperience in matters of nuclear strategy. In a reflection of that view, the concept was quickly and somewhat contemptuously dubbed 'star wars'. The unspoken expectation was that SDI would remain in the realm of lofty rhetoric and never become part of the US defence programme. When it became clear that the President was committed to pursuing SDI, these initial reactions gave way to expressions of scepticism and concern. Several features of this second-stage response are noteworthy. First, opinions for and against the idea were quickly and confidently expressed in spite of the fact that details about SDI remain scarce (and sometimes contradictory), and that formal decisions about deployment probably will not be made for years or even decades. Secondly, reaction to the President's presumably laudable goal, a world made safe from the threat of nuclear war, has been predominantly negative. Thirdly, the consequences of SDI-whether they are judged to be good or bad-have tended to be regarded as immutable and beyond the control of policymakers to shape: thus far there has been relatively little discussion of how policy and strategy should-or at least could-be adapted in the light of SDI. There undoubtedly are those cynics who expect SDI to result in the expenditure of substantial resources but produce little if any change in the strategic equation. That outcome, however, is unlikely. Two results seem virtually inescapable whether or not SDI technology proves feasible and whatever the ultimate decisions about deployment. First, as the technology programme proceeds, the core premises of