Abstract
Natural kinds, real kinds, or, following J.S. Mill simply, Kinds, are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or “special”) sciences. Essential natures are less in vogue. I show that the realist would do well to couple her Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen their epistemic and ontological credentials. I argue that these essential natures need not however be intrinsic to the Kind’s members; they may be historical. I concentrate on assessing the merits of historical essential natures in a paradigm case of Kinds in the non-fundamental sciences: species. I specify two basic jobs for essential natures: (1) offering individuation criteria, and (2) providing a causal explanation of the Kind’s multiple projectable properties. I argue that at least in the case of species historical essences are fit for both tasks. The principled resistance to Kinds with historical essences should also be cleared.
Highlights
Natural kinds, real kinds, or, on following John Stuart Mill, Kinds, are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental sciences (Boyd 1991, 2010; Kornblith 1995; Wilson 1999; Snyder 2005; cf. Massimi 2014)
My argument here will almost exclusively concern the case of species and the claim that historical essences can underpin these local claims of scientific realism
I will make some suggestive remarks along the way about how the morals about scientific realism and historical essences might generalize to other cases, a full exploration of the generalizability will have to wait for another occasion
Summary
Real kinds, or, on following John Stuart Mill, Kinds, are thought to be an important asset for scientific realists in the non-fundamental (or “special”) sciences (Boyd 1991, 2010; Kornblith 1995; Wilson 1999; Snyder 2005; cf. Massimi 2014). I will argue that the realist would do well to couple their Kinds with essential natures in order to strengthen their epistemic and ontological credentials. I will make some suggestive remarks along the way about how the morals about scientific realism and historical essences might generalize to other cases, a full exploration of the generalizability will have to wait for another occasion.. I will make some suggestive remarks along the way about how the morals about scientific realism and historical essences might generalize to other cases, a full exploration of the generalizability will have to wait for another occasion.1 This limited focus on species has some important advantages though. My quarrel will not primarily be with intrinsic essentialism of species (Devitt 2008, 2010)—or only to the extent that it invokes skeptical claims against historical essences (cf. Godman and Papineau 2019)
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