Abstract
ABSTRACT : Focusing a particular, but not exclusive attention on Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism, this paper lays stress on the sceptical double-faced attitude towards language-practice. On one hand Sextus dwelles on the lack of any truth-value and ontological intentionality of sceptical formulae (phônai), since they are "avowals" or "confessions" of a passive state of mind (pathos), free, therefore, from the charge of self- contradiction. On the other hand Sextus' criticism against Dogmatists claims to be a linguistic strategy, rooted in a new kind of logic and limited to the special game of opposing dogmatic assertions lacking any veritative functions.
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