Scepticism and Mysticism

Abstract

PROFESSOR DANIEL INGALLS is neither a sceptic nor a mystic. But it is obvious to some of us that he has sympathy for both. It may be that he has more sympathy for the sceptic than for the mystic. In my study of the history of scepticism in India I have often been struck by the following phenomenon: The outstanding and even extreme sceptical arguments are usually to be found in the writings of the authors who were initially mystically inclined or who would like to push the philosophical or dialectical argumentation to its utmost limit so that the rational means would prove to be bankrupt! I propose to deal with this phenomenon here very briefly. It is hoped that an 'empathetic' understanding of such a phenomenon is possible even when one does neither have a sceptical point of view nor even a mystical one. In this I have only followed the line which Professor Ingalls has taken in many other similar studies. It will be seen at the end that the connection that I believe to be there between the sceptical attitude and the mystical is a contingent one. A sceptic does not necessarily become a mystic. Or, to put the matter in another way, it is not true, at least not always true, that the end of the path for a true and serious sceptic is mysticism. Sceptics do not always take a plunge into the 'oceanic feeling' of mysticism. At least I do not hold such a thesis. But that is why it seems more interesting and more intriguing to find the above phenomenon: why did the sceptical tradition form a very important, and almost an inseparable, component of the major mystical traditions of India? What did the mystics have to do with the use of logic and rational means that would have been more appropriate for scepticism? Why is this craving for attempts at rational explanation using logic and dialectics if at the end all this would be superseded by some irrational, inexplicable and ineffable consciousness? If I am going to enjoy poetry would it matter much if I discover that the poet used bad logic and fallacious arguments? The answer to such question is not immediately obvious. A philosophical sceptic is not an iconclast or an aggressor in the Temple of Truth, but because of his extreme concern for truth he is reluctant to accept anything less. He persists in seeking and probing. If a philosopher is one who tries to expound or defend a view about the world or the way the world is or appears to us, a sceptic takes the position of his opponent. Scepticism has in fact formed an important part of philosophic activity in almost all ages everywhere. Indeed, philosophy today is more commonly understood as a kind of activity, and sceptical questions and doubts supply the vital moving force of such activity. It is difficult to define scepticism. But some broad characterisations can be offered. If the word 'sceptic' means simply 'an inquirer' or 'an investigator' (as has been noted by R. G. Bury in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism)' then many philosophers could be called 'sceptics'. But obviously the word has a more specific sense. Scepticism can be understood as a critical philosophical attitude consistently maintained throughout. However, scepticism has acquired a negative connotation. A sceptic rejects the validity of any knowledgeclaim or truth-claim. The spirit of scepticism can be carried on to the fields of morality, religion and politics. The concern of the sceptic in such fields is not so much with truth as with the justification or rightness of certain principles, concepts or ideas. Scepticism usually aligns itself with pessimism as well as 'passivism'. It is difficult for a sceptic to be an optimist or a political activist or a revolutionary, for his scepticism would not be consistent with his activity. But activism and scepticism would not be an impossible combination in some humans, for consistency is not an inalienable trait of all humans. A sceptic's positive characterization is that he is a seeker after truth. In practice, however, a sceptic may be a conformist with the prevailing social and political norms. He may live by the existing rules and standards while not believing in their absolute validity. He is not, as I have already said, a revolutionary, for he lacks conviction about the truth or the goal of such actions. A sceptic has to be a good dialectician, skillful in the art of argumentation. He can be a 'sophist' in a nonpejorative sense. He is like a well-armed man, always