Abstract
In RFID system a tag is attached to an object which might own by a number of owners during its life time. This requires the RFID system to transfer ownership of the tag to its new owner. The ownership transfer has to protect privacy of current and new owner. Many ownership tag ownership transfer exists in the literature, however, most of them are impractical or insecure to implement on current passive RFID tags. We are proposing a timer based ownership transfer protocol for closed loop RFID systems. The proposal in this paper includes two implement scenario to cover diverse tags type. The protocol will ensure security and privacy of involved parties in the idle circumstances. Our comparison shows that the proposed protocol is more secure and practical than existing similar ones.
Highlights
Radio frequency Identification (RFID) is a data capturing technology which uses radio frequency (RF) to identify tags
The major achievement of RFID technology can be achieved by offering the ability and possibility for a large scale automated data collection wirelessly
Many security and privacy threats might occur during the tag ownership transfer such as relay attacks, replay attacks, cloning, spoofing, Denial of Service (DoS), etc
Summary
Radio frequency Identification (RFID) is a data capturing technology which uses radio frequency (RF) to identify tags ( known as transponders). Many security and privacy threats might occur during the tag ownership transfer such as relay attacks, replay attacks, cloning, spoofing, Denial of Service (DoS), etc. An attacker can change the random number in acknowledgement transmission from tag to TTP which will be discarded by TTP as it has incorrect value This situation can potentially be used to generate a de-synchronization attack for a specific period of time which will lead to DoS attack. R et al [4] proposed a secure tag ownership transfer protocol for closed loop system based on The Quadratic Residue property. It is insecure against impersonation attack and DoS attack [3]. The Diffie- Hellman key exchange is vulnerable to Man-in-the-middle attack [6] that Ray et al protocol suggests it would prevent
Published Version (Free)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have