Abstract

The model of precaution has become a central tool of law and economics, beginning with Judge Learned Hand’s brilliant opinion in United States v Carroll Towing Co.1 In it he argues that a defendant should be found liable for harm if and only if the expected cost of additional care is less than the expected benefit.2 The model of precaution relies upon the economics of incentives, a subfield of game theory—the study of how individuals choose actions when these actions affect others.3 The landmark books of Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner, and Professor Steven Shavell illustrate how the precaution model illuminates a wide variety of legal rules.4 Professor Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed show how it can be used to

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