Saṃghabhadra on Perception of Non-existence

Abstract

Can non-existence be perceived? While the answer may seem obviously negative, proving this is not straightforward. This article extracts several arguments for the claim that "non-existence cannot be an object of perception" from the reasoning provided by Saṃghabhadra regarding "non-existence cannot be an object of *buddhi. Two main arguments are reconstructed and both are reductio ad absurdum. The first suggests that if any non-existence could be perceived, all instances of non-existence would be perceived. Combined with Saṃghabhadra's causal theory of perception, this implies that one perception could perceive all instances of non-existence. The second posits that if non-existence were an object of perception, it would result in no perception occurring at all. As a problem-oriented study, this article reconstructs and evaluates Saṃghabhadra's arguments, demonstrating that "non-existence cannot be perceived" is not as easily proved as it appears, and Saṃghabhadra’s insightful arguments, though vulnerable to challenges, hold promise for further defense.