A Relational Response toNewman's Objection toRussell's Causal Theory of Perception

Abstract

AbstractThe causal theory of perception (CTP) has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny from philosophers of mind interested in the nature of perception.M. H. Newman's set‐theoretic objection to Russell's structuralist version of theCTP, in his 1928 paper “MrRussell's Causal Theory of Perception” has not, to my knowledge, figured in these discussions. In this paper I aim to show that it should:Newman's objection can be generalized to yield a particularly powerful and incisive challenge to all versions of theCTP. In effect it says that if theCTPis true, at least one of the following claims must be false. (1) Our perception‐based judgements are made true or false by the state of mind independent objects. (2) The concepts we use in such judgments refer to the intrinsic, mind‐independent properties of such objects. (3) Experience provides us with knowledge of these properties. The paper sets out the structure of the problem asNewman saw it, extends it to current debates in theory of perception and considers various responses to it. The response I argue for involves jettisoning theCTPin favour of a relational account of perceptual experience, in a way that allows us to hold onto all three claims.