Abstract
The contribution deals with computer based railway safety systems. It shortly concerns problems associated with using computer systems in comparison with traditional safety systems. The attention is paid to formal and semiformal methods in development and approval of railways systems, seen in the context of standardization and legislation framework. The author summarizes current state of using formal and semiformal methods from whole life cycle point of view of railway safety system in the area of Slovak and Czech railways and possible reasons for their rare use.
Highlights
The system with safety responsibility is a system whose incorrect function may have very serious consequences such as loss of human life, severe injuries, large-scale environmental damage, or considerable economic penalties [10]
Functional safety is a part of the overall safety that depends on a system or equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs
Most software failures are the result of errors in the software which themselves result from failures in the development process, such as incorrect specification
Summary
The system with safety responsibility is a system whose incorrect function (failure) may have very serious consequences such as loss of human life, severe injuries, large-scale environmental damage, or considerable economic penalties [10]. The relay type N (safety relay) is constructed in such a way that the force of gravity itself causes the relay armature to drop off if the relay is not powered, and the contacts are made of non-weldable materials. These properties are taken into account by a relay system design in such a way that a controlled circuit is in error case always off (except for the unlikely case the attraction force does not work). One of the reasons is the discrete nature of computer systems [10]
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary 
Published Version (
Free)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call