Abstract
This article summarizes the results of the safety evaluation of the Evaporation of Lithium and Vapor Extraction (EVOLVE) W-alloy first wall (FW) and blanket concept1. We have analyzed the EVOLVE design response during a confinement bypass accident. A confinement bypass accident was chosen because, based on previous safety studies2, this accident can produce environmental releases by breaching the primary radioactive confinement boundary of EVOLVE, which is the EVOLVE vacuum vessel (VV). As a consequence of a bypass accident, air from a room adjoining the reactor enters the plasma chamber by way of a failed VV port. This air reacts with the high temperature metals inside of the VV to release energy in the case of a lithium spill, or to mobilize radioactive material by oxidation, and then transport this material to the environment by natural convection airflow through the failed VV port. We use the MELCOR code3 to analyze the response of EVOLVE during this accident. Based on these results, the EVOLVE concept can meet the no-evacuation dose goal set by the DOE Fusion Safety Standard4 if the EVOLVE confinement building ventilation system is closed within two hours of the onset of this accident.
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