Russia's Political Party System as a (Continued) Impediment to Democratization: The 2003 Duma and 2004 Presidential Elections in Perspective

Abstract

The primary purpose of this research note is to offer a brief assessment of 2003 Duma and 2004 presidential elections in light of arguments concerning development of Russia's party system that we presented earlier in Demokratizatsiya (Riggs and Schraeder 2004). In that article, we argued that Russia's transition to democracy has been inhibited by development of a dysfunctional and unstable party system. Specifically, we made three arguments: (1) sudden collapse of Soviet system disrupted development of nascent party system, severing its connections to society and leaving it to be reconstituted from above by elites in circumstances that limited its connections with society and political system; (2) later changes made to overall political system during 1993-95 and 1999-2000 election cycles have reinforced party system's susceptibility to behavior of elite at expense of developing links between political and civil society; and (3) those changes also shaped incentives for self-interested elite action in ways that have led away from development of a well-structured party system. We concluded that, until Russian party system re-establishes its links with society and incentives of party elite behavior are shaped by need to promote societal interests rather than their own, Russia's party system will continue to be dysfunctional, contributing to democratic decay as opposed to assisting democratic consolidation. Unfortunately, proponents of strengthening democratic consolidation in Russia cannot take heart from 2003 Duma and 2004 presidential elections, which have become more elite driven, contributing to Mexicanization of Russian political party system (i.e., creation of a one-party dominant political system).The More Things Change, More Things Remain SameThe 1993 elections for newly created Duma and elections that followed were held under new rules designed to foster a stable party system. Half of Duma's 450 seats are elected by party list through a proportional representation system (in which votes are cast for parties, and seats are apportioned to based on percentage of vote attained), while remaining half are elected through a single-member district plurality system (in which votes are cast for individual candidates in electoral districts, and one with greatest number of votes wins). Rules were added to minimize insignificant and concentrate votes.A cursory examination of results of 2003 Duma election might suggest that a stable multiparty system is developing in Russia (see table 1). Most of have an established identity, whereas new are result of party consolidation rather than constituting elite parties of convenience. The Motherland (People's Patriotic Union) party has brought together more than thirty political organizations under one umbrella. The United Russia party was formed by merger of Unity and Fatherland-All Russia parties. The People's Party of Russian Federation represents transformation of People's Deputies Duma faction of independent candidates into an electoral party. Yeltsin's party of (Our Home Is Russia) has disappeared. Other in Duma hold only six seats divided among four parties, and contingent of independents is down to sixty-eight. In short, 2003 Duma election encouraged a less fragmented party system than had previously existed in Russia.These patterns do not signal that Russian civil society is becoming more vibrant and politically engaged, however. Russia's are still primarily elite driven, with main difference in 2003 and 2004 elections being that President Vladimir Putin became prime mover in Russian politics. The structure United Russia party was not as popular as outcome suggests. In a December 2003 survey that asked what party or political outlook respondents sympathized with most, only 20 percent responded the party of power (United Russia) while 30 percent responded none of them (Russia Votes 2004a). …