Russian Strategic Thinking on Asian Regionalism

Abstract

When Russians view the northern hemisphere they are inclined to see two grand expanses: the Euro-Atlantic region and the APR. The former appears as “the West,” whose meaning resonates from historic times. The latter, however, cannot be captured by a term such as “the East.” Only recently have images for looking past global forces and bilateral relations begun to reveal how to “deconstruct” this concept. In varied discourse, each concept divides into three parts. At the broadest level both expanses include the United States, suggesting a cross-oceanic region where even after the collapse of the Soviet Union Moscow faces America’s great power and hegemonic inclinations.1 At a middle level Atlantic is dropped from the Euro-Atlantic region and Pacific disappears from the Asia-Pacific, leaving a “macro region” increasingly in the hands of the European Union (EU) and what in 2005, with the first East Asian Summit, was coming to be marked as the start of the East Asian community. Closest to home, Russians grope to identify a third area separate from the space of the former Soviet republics, if still imprecise. To the east this micro region is called Northeast Asia. For each of the three levels of regional images the critical question is: Can Russia assert its presence so that gains outweigh loss of independence? Answers to the question “who is in control?” while initially troubling, have, for now at least, become sufficiently reassuring to prompt a new wave of strategic thinking.