Abstract
Originally intended as a swift regime-change operation by the Russian leadership, the Russo-Ukrainian War has evolved into a prolonged war of attrition. In that sense, this paper reassesses the transformation of the Russian way of warfare during the war through a focus on the battles of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and the Ukrainian Summer Offensive. Accordingly, the theoretical underpinnings of Russian strategy, particularly the enduring influence of Soviet-era legacy, are highlighted in the first part. In the second part, this research offers insights into the Russian military praxis during the war by drawing on various sources, including Telegram channels. It is shown that the Russian army has focused on the combined employment of a new reconnaissance-fire system (ROS), reconnaissance-strike system (RUS), infantry assaults, and umbrella of integrated air defence and electronic warfare systems for force protection and attrition during costly offensives like Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Consequently, this paper asserts that the Russian war machine effectively responded to the necessities of attrition warfare by updating its operational art, drawing on the Soviet legacy.
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