Russia's Security Policy in Asia in Times of Economic Uncertainty

Abstract

The paper examines the impact of the global economic crisis on the development of Russia’s security policy in Asia. In the final years of Vladimir Putin's presidency (2007-08), the Russian leadership made a dramatic reassessment of major global trends, sources of power, security threats, and the roles of key actors in the changing international environment. On the doctrinal level, the contours of the Kremlin’s new eastern policy has been consistent during the tenure of Dmitri Medvedev, Putin’s successor in the Kremlin. Three major developments predetermined the strengthening of the “Asian component” of Russian foreign and security strategy. Firstly, Russia’s “new globalist” approach to world politics which links national interest to the restoration of Russia’s global competitiveness and a great power status. Secondly, the imperative of modernization which requires Russia’s imminent integration into the global economic space filled with multiple geoeconomic risks and security threats. Thirdly, domestic political issues in the spheres of political control, administrative efficiency and development, critical for the interpretation of national security priorities by ruling political and business elites, especially prior to the new electoral cycle in 2011-12. The paper overviews these three groups of factors, demonstrating their impact on the Kremlin leadership and its policies aimed at Russia’s adjustment to the dynamic Asian security environment. The paper maintains that the recent global economic downturn has sharpened Moscow’s strife toward a decisive role in global affairs, aggravated its concerns of slow modernization and domestic socio-political situation. As a result, the Russian leadership is trying to reshape its foreign and security policy in Asia originally guided by the “East-West” dilemma toward a more comprehensive, proactive strategy oriented to maximizing gains from a deeper integration into the world system, and getting an access to financial and material resources including those of Asia, to eventually restore Russia’s relative influence, regionally and globally. The Asian vector of Russian foreign and security policy activism is considered to be even more important for effective management of complex domestic problems in times of economic turbulence. Moscow’s China policy remains the key component of the new Russian strategy. Driven by financial needs and the imperative of modernization, Moscow has made unprecedented steps toward a closer cooperation with Beijing which may potentially result in Russia’s irreversible gravitation to the China’s orbit and thus weaken Russia’s chances to craft the multipolar order in Eurasia. The paper concludes that, under the current circumstances, Moscow will hardly reconcile its accommodation to the emerging Sino-centered international order in the Greater East Asia with its own integrative efforts to create its exclusive zone of influence in the region. Russia will have to subsume its great power ambitious and security interests to Beijing’s grand strategy of creating a new, China-centered regional order in Asia.