Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article asks what opportunities are available to start untying the persistent deadlock in the Nagorny Karabakh (NK) conflict when we take into account not only the positions of the conflict parties but also the fact that Russia’s strategic interests define its stance on the negotiation process and promote certain conditions for settlement. These conditions recognize Russia’s existing military presence in the region as well as the political and economic influence embedded in its Eurasian integration projects. The article does not advocate any parties’ interests, and it does not claim to present conditions which are acceptable to any of the parties. Instead, it examines how Russia’s interests in the wider region, which includes Turkey and Iran, relate to the basic elements of settlement which have been identified in the Minsk Process as the elaboration of the “Basic Principles”. We argue that understanding how these two action frames are interconnected in the Russian policy argumentation is the key to understanding its approach to conflict settlement in NK. Our main analytical point of departure is to unfold strategic perspectives by examining immediate and strategic goals in the policy argumentation. Empirically, the article concentrates on analysing the policy discourse connected with the major incidents of ceasefire violations in July–August 2014 and April 2016.

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