Russell on the Structure of Propositions

Abstract

The comparison of Russell's views on semantics before 1905 with the theory of Frege allows one to expose the common sources of their interest in semantical problems and the specific character of their examination. During the investigation of the principles of mathematics and elaboration and realization of the program of logicism, questions regarding the logical structure of mathematical and logical propositions as well as the relation of linguistic signs and logical forms arise for both authors. Russell assumes the possibility of two kinds of analysis of the structure of propositions. One of them - by means of propositional functions - is analogous to Frege's analysis. But at first it is not accepted by Russell as fundamental. He prefers another kind of analysis, namely that by means of relations. This preference is conditioned in the first place by the intensional interpretation of propositions and in the second place by his ontological and epistemological views. These are based on the theory of external relations which implies the acceptance of real existence of particulars and of the specific relation of predication, resulting in the consideration of predicates as terms.)