Rule Formalization, Bureaucratic Red Tape, and Prosocial Rule Breaking Among Street-Level Bureaucrats: A Citizen-Centered Perspective

Abstract

Past research indicates that rules can prevent unbureaucratic behaviors among street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). In this research, I draw upon the citizen-agent narrative to propose that when formalized rules are perceived as red tape that negatively affects citizens, SLBs will be more likely to engage in prosocial rule breaking (PSRB) due to their sympathy for citizens in such a situation. I further propose that this effect will be more pronounced among SLBs who interact more frequently with citizens. Data from a sample of local government employees in Thailand were collected to test these hypotheses. Results from latent moderated mediation structural equation modeling analyses revealed that, while rule formalization has a direct negative effect on PSRB, it leads to an increase in PSRB via red tape perceptions and feelings of sympathy for citizens who suffer from red tape. Contact with citizens was also found to amplify the effect of rule formalization on red tape perceptions, such that rule formalization has a stronger indirect influence on PSRB among SLBs who have more frequent contact with citizens. These results point to the importance of maintaining the “optimal” level of rules in citizen-state interactions to ensure that SLBs can perform their public service work effectively.