Abstract

Red tape is an important topic in administration. For example, the title of the Report of the National Performance Review (NPA), From Red Tape to Results, emphasizes the objective of reducing red tape in government (Gore, 1993). In spite of its prominence, however, scholarly analyses of red tape have been relatively rare. Administrative analysts have conducted much research pertinent to the topic, but often employ a concept other than red tape. In this article, we discuss the results of a survey of public and private managers that explored their perceptions of red tape in their organizations. The survey included questions representing different dimensions of red tape and different ways of measuring it. We analyzed differences between the public and private managers on these measures because theoretical and case-descriptive analyses of red tape often assert that public organizations have more red tape than private ones. We also analyzed the consistency of the questionnaire responses with several different hypotheses about why red tape occurs. The hypotheses included a goal ambiguity hypothesis that claims that ambiguous goals in the public sector cause managers to create red tape; an insecurity hypothesis that argues that public managers initiate red tape because they feel risk-averse and insecure about their authority; and an expectancy hypothesis that depicts red tape as the result of weak linkages between performance and extrinsic rewards such as pay and promotion in the public sector. The results showed some sharp differences between public and private managers' perceptions about certain aspects of red tape. The public managers were much more likely to perceive their personnel rules as making it hard to base a manager's pay and promotion on performance. We also found some support for the goal ambiguity hypothesis, but for both sectors. Similar to some previous surveys, we found no differences between public and private managers on perceived organizational goal ambiguity. We also found that the managers' questionnaire responses showed some consistency with the insecurity and expectancy hypotheses. Red Tape: Definition and Research Issues Red tape can be defined as rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden for the organization but have no efficacy for the rules' functional object (Bozeman, 1993; 283). Red tape can originate inside the organization or from external sources. It can have an internal impact or an external impact. This definition implies that red tape is useless and unduly burdensome. That dimension of red tape can be difficult to assess, because what one person sees as irritating red tape, another person may see as essential rules and procedures. Because we were conducting a mail survey, we took the approach of asking managers about their perceptions of red tape and related matters. As described in Appendix A, the survey included questions about the general level of red tape in the organization and about the intensity of rule enforcement. The survey also asked about constraints and delays under personnel rules and procedures, because of their prominence in discussions of red tape in government (Gore, 1993; National Academy of Public Administration, 1986; Thompson, 1994). These questions reflect a working definition of red tape that holds that it exists when managers say it does, when they perceive intensive rule enforcement, and when they perceive constraints and delays from rules and procedures in such areas as personnel. We feel that this is a valuable approach for the present. If the National Performance Review and other initiatives aim to reduce constraining rules in government, we need to develop ways to assess the existing levels of such rules and changes in those levels. We also need more understanding of how these perceptions relate to other responses of managers and to test the sorts of hypotheses we examine here. Comparing public managers' responses to those of private managers gives us further comparative purchase for analyzing these perceptions. …

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