Rule-following and its Ramifications

Abstract

In the collection under review, Boghossian (2008) assembles 14 of his papers from the last 20 years.1 They are presented in four groups. The first three groups are focused on, respectively, the nature of mental content, the links of content with self-knowledge and the links of content with a priori knowledge. The two papers of the last group, written with David Velleman, deal with colour and colour concepts. Each group of papers is followed by a bibliography, where responses and possible further reading are listed. Since Boghossian has been a notable contributor on all the topics mentioned, at the very least this collection provides a useful entry point to worthwhile literature on good problems. But one can say much more. Boghossian writes with acuity and ingenuity and his style is clear and direct. He is prepared to challenge and rethink venerable doctrines and is also prepared to revise his own views when good arguments are brought against them. He shows admirable persistence, in returning to topics from different angles, bringing out more implications of the positions explored and the complexity of the issues. He does not at any point gloss over difficulties or pretends to more completeness or decisiveness than the material warrants. So we have here much rigorous and judicious discussion of a thought-provoking kind. The fourth group of papers, on colour, is not closely linked in theme to the rest of the collection. And although the issues merit further consideration we will not pursue them here. Let me just note that in these papers Boghossian and Velleman lay out two of the more attractive realist accounts of colour, dispositional and physicalist, and argue that no current version of such theories is acceptable. In the sections which follow, I shall first consider briefly the papers on content and self-knowledge, and after that will turn to the nine papers of the first and third sections on the interlinked topics of content, rule-following and the a priori. In his Introduction Boghossian writes, with reference to the papers on the nature of content, 'For all the attention they have received, in my view both Wittgenstein's discussion and Kripke's exposition of it remain underappreciated, to the detriment of current work in philosophy of mind. That is not to say, by any means, that a proper engagement with these arguments would result in a moral that is recognisably 'Wittgensteinian.' On the contrary, on my view what emerges from such an engagement is a conception of meaning that is anything but: realist, anti-reductivist and in no obvious way hostile to the idea of a private language. Nevertheless, it seems to me that both Kripke's and Wittgenstein's texts contain considerable insights and it is a pity that they have come to be relatively neglected.'