Rule and Revenue in Egypt and Rome: Political Stability and Fiscal Institutions

Abstract

Herrschaft und Staatseinkommen in ?gypten und Rom: Zur Wechselwirkung von Politischer Stabilit?t und Besteuerung?. This paper investigates what determines fiscal institutions and the burden of taxation using a case study from ancient history. It evaluates Levi's model of taxation in the Roman Republic, according to which rulers' high discount rates in periods of political instability encour age them to adopt a more predatory fiscal regime. The evi dence for fiscal reform in the transition from the Republic to the Principate seems to support her hypothesis but re mains a matter of debate among historians. Egypt's transi tion from a Hellenistic kingdom to a Roman province under the Principate provides an analogous case for which there are better data. The Egyptian evidence shows a correlation between rulers' discount rates and fiscal regimes that is consistent with Levi's hypothesis.