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Notes on Contributors

A major part of philosophy of medicine, although not all of it, is a branch of philosophy of science. This part is not only currently emerging. Many important contributions belong to this field, like Boorse’s ‘Health as a theoretical concept’ [1], which is probably the most cited article in the philosophy of medicine. Some contributions, although relevant for philosophy of science, are entrenched in bioethics, medical humanities, and historical and social studies of science. Other contributions come from fields such as philosophy of biology, general philosophy of science, philosophy of neuroscience and philosophy of cognitive science, and can rightly be considered pieces of philosophy of medicine. This is so either because they thoroughly scrutinize examples of diseases or because they investigate scientific methods not necessarily specific to, but mostly used in, medical science. Certainly, questions about biological functions, causality, evidence, mechanisms and decision making are not only relevant to the study of medicine, but their specificity to this field makes them important for philosophy of medicine as well. The result is institutional dispersion. Despite the existence of a bunch of periodicals, there is no prominent journal in the philosophy of medicine as a branch of philosophy of science. Academic positions in this field often demand competence in bioethics and although no master’s programme in the world is yet dedicated to this specialty alone, some are emerging. Philosophers in this field, in early career or not, do not have many opportunities to gather for international events: the International Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable organizes the only one specific to the field. Yet philosophers of medicine significantly contribute papers and symposia to events such as the European Advanced Seminar in the Philosophy of the Life Science; the International Society for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology; the Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science; the Philosophy of Science Association; and the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice meetings. Some sessions in the meetings of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Healthcare have been dedicated to philosophy of medicine as a part of philosophy of science. Recently, a significant introduction to philosophy of medicine has been published: the Philosophy of Medicine: Handbook of Philosophy of Science [2]. Apart from dedicated journals such as Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy and Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy – which has significantly drifted towards bioethics for some years – some others have contributed special issues dedicated to philosophy of medicine, as the Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, and more accept from time to time a paper very relevant for the philosophy of medicine, such as Biology and Philosophy; Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Part C; and History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences. To contribute to a consolidation of the field, the International Advanced Seminar in the Philosophy of Medicine (IASPM) was created. The IASPM is a biannual event, the first session of which has been held in Paris from 20 June to 22 June 2013. It is sponsored by a consortium of five research centres: the Center for the Humanities and Health at King’s College (London, UK); the Institut fur Geschichte, Theorie und Ethik der Medizin at Johannes Gutenberg (Mainz, Germany); the European School of Molecular Medicine (Milan, Italy); the IHPST at Pantheon-Sorbonne (Paris, France); and the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Pittsburgh (USA). The Paris session gathered 22 advanced students or junior scholars in the philosophy of medicine: 11 were selected from each partner university and 11 others were selected by standard open call for contributions and peer review. Four senior philosophers gave talks and three others coordinated workshop sessions along with three PhD students. Sixty registered participants attended the event. The topic of the conference was ‘Unity and autonomy in the philosophy of medicine’. It was purposely not very specific, so that bs_bs_banner

In this article, I show the role that the philosopher of cognitive science can currently play in cognitive science research. I argue for the important, and not yet considered, role of the philosophy of cognitive science in cognitive science, that is, the importance of cooperation between philosophers of science with cognitive scientists in investigating the research methods and theoretical assumptions of cognitive science. At the beginning of the paper I point out, how the philosopher of science, here, the philosopher of cognitive science, can participate in interdisciplinary research. I am opting of the cooperation in investigating the so-called reflective problems. Then, I discuss four examples of issues important for the cognitive science, in which the competences possessed by the philosopher are useful. At the ending I point out wider landscape of possible cooperation of philosophers with cognitive scientists.

Introduction: Hallucinations research is increasingly incorporating philosophy or the work of philosophically trained individuals. We present three different ways in which this is successfully implemented to the enhancement of knowledge and understanding of hallucinations and related phenomena. Method: We review contributions from phenomenology, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of science and psychiatry. Results: We demonstrate that these areas of philosophy make significant contributions to hallucinations research. Phenomenology gives us a sophisticated and critical understanding of the lived experience of hallucinations. Philosophy of cognitive science enables big-picture theorising and synthesis of ideas, as well as a critical engagement with new paradigms. Philosophy of science and psychiatry raises valuable and theoretically informed questions about diagnosis and categorisation. Conclusions: These contributions reflect both the methodological variety within philosophy and its relevance to the hallucinations researcher.

Philosophy of science studies the methods, theories, and concepts used by scientists. It mainly developed as a field in its own right during the twentieth century and is now a diversified and lively research area. This book surveys the current state of the discipline by focusing on central themes such as confirmation of scientific hypotheses, scientific explanation, causality, the relationship between science and metaphysics, scientific change, the relationship between philosophy of science and science studies, the role of theories and models, and unity of science. These themes define general philosophy of science. The book also presents subdisciplines in the philosophy of science dealing with the main sciences: logic, mathematics, physics, biology, medicine, cognitive science, linguistics, social sciences, and economics. Although it is common to address the specific philosophical problems raised by physics and biology in such a book, the place assigned to the philosophy of special sciences is much more unusual. Most authors collaborate on a regular basis in their research or teaching and share a common vision of philosophy of science and its place within philosophy and academia in general. The chapters have been written in close accordance with the three editors, thus achieving strong unity of style and tone.

While the extended cognition (EC) thesis has gained more followers in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind and knowledge, our main goal is to discuss a different area of significance of the EC thesis: its relation to philosophy of science. In this introduction, we outline two major areas: (I) The role of the thesis for issues in the philosophy of cognitive science, such as: How do notions of EC figure in theories or research programs in cognitive science? Which versions of the EC thesis appear, and with which arguments to support them? (II) The potentials and limits of the EC thesis for topics in general philosophy of science, such as: Can naturalism perhaps be further advanced by means of the more recent EC thesis? Can we understand “big science” or laboratory research better by invoking some version of EC? And can the EC thesis help in overcoming the notorious cognitive/social divide in science studies?

The free energy principle says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected states and that they achieve this by minimizing their free energy. This corresponds to the brain’s job of minimizing prediction error, selective sampling of sensory data, optimizing expected precisions, and minimizing complexity of internal models. These in turn map on to perception, action, attention, and model selection, respectively. This means that the free energy principle is extremely ambitious: it aims to explain everything about the mind. The principle is bound to be controversial, and hostage to empirical fortune. It may also be thought preposterous: the theory may seem either too ambitious or too trivial to be taken seriously. This chapter introduces the ideas behind the free energy principle and then proceeds to discuss the charge of preposterousness from the perspective of philosophy of science. It is shown that whereas it is ambitious, controversial and needs further evidence in its favour, it is not preposterous. The argument proceeds by appeal to: (i) the notion of inference to the best explanation, (ii) a comparison with the theory of evolution, (iii) the notion of explaining-away, and (iv) a “biofunctionalist” account of Bayesian processing. The heuristic starting point is the simple idea that the brain is just one among our bodily organs, each of which has an overall function. The outcome is not just a defence of the free energy principle against various challenges but also a deeper anchoring of this theory in philosophy of science, yielding an appreciation of the kind of explanation of the mind it offers.

This book is a special edition, compiled for to the MSc Course Research Methodologies as taught at the Faculty of Aerospace Engineering at Delft University of Technology. It is a compilation of useful chapters from several sources on how to structure, set up, carry out and write up your (thesis) research to aid you in writing your research plan. Next to that it acts as a companion during your thesis research. After introducing you to the philosophy of scientific research, subsequent chapters each contribute to the different phases of your research. The book uniquely allows for the often multi- or interdisciplinary research many of you carry out, based on the established Dutch university tradition of (semi-)independent student research, creating a thread through the process for you to follow. This edition is a collection of chapters from An Introduction to Interdisciplinary Research (2016), edited by Steph Menken and Machiel Keestra, and Academic Skills for Interdisciplinary Studies. Revised edition (2019), by Koen van der Gaast, Laura Koenders and Ger Post, published by Amsterdam University Press.

This issue collects a selection of contributed papers presented at the 14th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Nancy, July 2011. These papers were originally presented within two of the main sections of the Congress. They deal with general philosophy of science (including ethical and historical aspects of philosophy of science), and philosophy of biology, physics, chemistry and economics. A first volume of contributed papers, dedicated to logic, philosophy of mathematics and cognitive science, and philosophy of technology, appeared in the last issue of Philosophia Scientiæ (18-3), 2014.

DON ROSS (Winnipeg, 1962) is professor of economics at the University of Cape Town (South Africa) and is program director of methodology at the Center for Economic Analysis of Risk (CEAR) at the J. Mack Robinson School of Business at Georgia State University (USA). He is co-founder of the Research Unit in Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics (RUBEN) at the University of Cape Town. From 2012 to 2014 Ross was chair of the executive board of the International Network for Economic Method (INEM), and remains an active member of the editorial boards of the Journal of Economic Methodology, Biological Theory, and Bioeconomics. He holds a PhD in philosophy of science (1990) from the University of Western Ontario.The scope of Ross' work is staggering. His areas of specialization span economic methodology, game theory, experimental economics of risk and time preferences, addiction and impulsive consumption, the history of economics, and philosophy of science (from logical positivism to scientific metaphysics). Moreover, he has published, refereed, and organized symposia on topics as diverse as biological evolution, human language and signalling dynamics, artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life modelling, connectionist theories of cognition, cognitive learning theory, analysis of econometric methods, political economy of international trade, African industry studies, and economic development (with emphasis on development in South Africa).Ross' published monographs include: Philosophy of economics (2014), Economic theory and cognitive science: microexplanation (2005), What people want: the concept of utility from Bentham to game theory (1999), and Metaphor, meaning and cognition (1993). His collaborations include Scientific metaphysics (2012, with James Ladyman and Harold Kincaid), Distributed cognition and the will (2007, with David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid, and G. Lynn Stevens), Handbook of the philosophy of economics (2009, with Harold Kincaid), Midbrain mutiny: the picoeconomics and neuroeconomics of disordered gambling (2008, with Carla Sharp, Rudy E. Vuchinich, and David Spurrett), Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized (2007, James Ladyman), and Dennett's philosophy: a comprehensive assessment (2000, with David Thompson and Andrew Brooks). To date, he has published upward of fifty scholarly articles, three dozen book chapters, and a score of reviews and review articles. He has also contributed over a hundred mass-market articles on trade and industrial policy in Africa.In this interview, professor Ross explores his intellectual roots and surveys his transition from cognitive scientist to economist. He discusses his involvement with Daniel Dennett, the virtues of economic optimization theory, and the merits (and demerits) of integrating economics with its neighbour disciplines.EJPE: The story of your academic training is very interesting: You started out as a philosopher interested in cognitive science-how did this segue into studying economics? Can you say a little bit about your background as a philosopher and your early interests in cognitive science?DON ROSS: It was a rapid trip across a wide intellectual landscape. I started offbeing interested in continental philosophy, specifically Merleau-Ponty's brand of phenomenology. Then I read Doug Hofstadter's Godel, Escher, Bach (1980), in my final undergraduate year, and was entranced by the deep intellectual roots of the study of machine intelligence. My alma mater, Western Ontario, was strong in cognitive science-Zenon Pylyshyn was there at the time-and it was possible to specialize in cognitive science within the philosophy of science PhD programme. But it was 1986, and the 'new' connectionism was just being born. I was sure that bringing a more biological flavour into AI made sense, so wanted to study that. But the necessary formalism for neural network modelling is the mathematics of optimisation, not formal logic as with classical AI. …

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the quality characteristics of an action research thesis, compared to traditional research thesis writing, by drawing on the literature and our experience with supervising and examining action research theses. We identify key problem areas in the literature and suggest effective strategies for meeting these challenges and avoiding pitfalls through reflective practice and questioning insight. We include sets of crucial questions for higher degree students to address through critical reflection on their action research projects. We use the term 'postgraduate' to describe all research higher degree studies and thesis writing.KeywordsProfessional LearningCritical ReflectionAction ResearcherProfessional Learning CommunityReflection DiaryThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT REQUEST OF AUTHOR.] When we ask questions like "why won't my car engine start?" or "why is John late?" we are searching for explanations. We search for explanations in a variety of contexts and for a variety of reasons. Sometimes we want a friend to give us just enough information to enable us to make a quick decision (e.g. "How do you know this left turn is correct?"). At other times, we want more precise, detailed information (e.g. "Why exactly does water transition directly from solid phase to gas phase?"). We search for explanations because we are curious and because we want to understand reality correctly. Moreover, we search for explanations because they help us solve problems, organize information, make predictions, design useful tools, and intervene on natural systems in countless ways. For this reason, explanation is a primary aim of science. Good explanations, it is argued, are intrinsically valuable because they give us a correct understanding of the world. For example, explanations give us understanding of causes, of necessity, of possibility, and of unification (Lipton 2009, 43). But, explanations can also provide a sort of "know-how" or skill-based understanding (Elgin 2007, de Regt 2009). For instance, explanation can provide the abilities needed to apply a model in different contexts or re-interpret various parts of a model. Because these cognitive and skill-based abilities are central to scientific goals (e.g. prediction, manipulation, formulation of laws), successful science is marked by its ability to provide us with good explanations (Salmon 1984, 259). Philosophy of science, then, is concerned with articulating a theory of explanation. Although the literature does not suggest a unique model for "scientific" explanation, one important test for a satisfactory theory of explanation is that it accurately characterize our best scientific explanations. Articulating a theory of explanation includes giving an account of at least two things: (1) the nature of explanatory information and (2) the value of explanatory information. Additionally, a good theory of explanation should provide criteria for judging an explanation's degree of success - a framework to help us distinguish between better and worse explanations. The aim of my dissertation research was to answer the following questions: Is there a bright-line between explanation and non-explanation that is context independent? Are there context independent criteria for successful explanations? What is the explanatory role of idealizations in models that explain phenomena in physics and biology? What is the relationship between explanation and understanding? Answers to these questions impact the way we view scientific practice in general and the standards by which we judge explanations (in both scientific and non-scientific contexts). For example, if the success of an explanation is context dependent, then it is evaluated of the basis of facts about the explanatory context in which it is offered. If so, then individual disciplines must justify their own appropriate standards for explanatory success. Thus, an explanation in biology (or history) is not necessarily less successful or less correct simply because it does not meet the criteria for an explanation in physics. The aim of my dissertation is to defend a strategy for evaluating an explanation's success - a salience account of explanatory power. According to this account, there is no context independent bright-line between explanation and non-explanation. Nor are there context independent criteria for successful explanations. To test this account, I apply it to two debates. The first debate is about how to characterize the explanatory power of idealization. The second is a debate about how to characterize the relationship between explanation and understanding. If the salience account can provide a solution to both debates, I take this as evidence that we should continue to develop this account.

That history, philosophy and sociology of science (HPS) have a lot to contribute to science education has been clearly shown by this journal ever since 1992. Numerous scholars from science education, history of science, philosophy of science, sociology of science, cognitive science and other disciplines have contributed to Science & Education over the years. These contributions have enriched our understanding of the concepts and processes of science, which in turn has contributed to improving the teaching and learning of science. Currently, it seems that there is an increased interest for exploring the relationship between science education and HPS further. More and more science educators have started delving into the details of HPS scholarship, often in collaboration with HPS scholars. In addition, more and more HPS scholars have come to realize that they have a lot to contribute to science education, by writing articles for Science & Education, or chapters for anthologies devoted to theoretical or pedagogical issues in science education (e.g., Kampourakis 2013a; Numbers and Kampourakis 2015). This journal is the most appropriate venue for scholars who want to explore how science education can be HPS-informed and HPS-enriched. It is an honor and a challenge for me to take over the editorship of Science & Education, succeeding its founding editor: Michael R. Matthews. My aim during my term is to continue what he has been doing for the past 25 years, and hopefully add to that. A major goal is to further expand the readership of the journal and make clear to people not (yet) related to IHPST that this is a journal of interest to all science educators. Science & Education is not a niche journal; it is a science education journal with a strong emphasis on conceptual and theoretical issues, which is informed by the history, philosophy and sociology of science and mathematics.

Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science is the second volume of a collection on Nietzsche and the Sciences, featuring essays addressing truth, epistemology, and the philosophy of science, with a substantial representation of analytically schooled Nietzsche scholars. This collection offers a dynamic articulation of the differing strengths of Anglo-American analytic and contemporary European approaches to philosophy, with translations from European specialists, notably Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker, Paul Valadier, and Walther Ch. Zimmerli.This broad collection also features a preface by Alasdair MacIntyre. Contributions explore Nietzsche's contributions to the philosophy of language and epistemology, and include essays on the social history of truth and the historical and cultural analyses of Serres and Baudrillard, as well as new contributions to the philosophy of science, including theological and hermeneutical approaches, history of science, the philosophy of medicine, cognitive science, and technology.

The article investigates what happens when philosophy (of science) meets and begins to establish connections with two formal research methods such as game theory and network science. We use citation analysis to identify, among the articles published in Synthese and Philosophy of Science between 1985 and 2021, those that cite the specialistic literature in game theory and network science. Then, we investigate the structure of the two corpora thus identified by bibliographic coupling and divide them into clusters of related papers by automatic community detection. Lastly, we construct by the same bibliometric techniques a reference map of philosophy, on which we overlay our corpora to map the diffusion of game theory and network science in the various sub-areas of recent philosophy. Three main results derive from this study. (i) Philosophers are interested not only in using and investigating game theory as a formal method belonging to applied mathematics and sharing many relevant features with social choice theory, but also in considering its applications in more empirically oriented disciplines such as social psychology, cognitive science, or biology. (ii) Philosophers focus on networks in two research contexts and in two different ways: in the debate on causality and scientific explanation, they consider the results of network science; in social epistemology, they employ network science as a formal tool. (iii) In the reference map, logic—whose use in philosophy dates back to a much earlier period—is distributed in a more uniform way than recently encountered disciplines such as game theory and network science. We conclude by discussing some methodological limitations of our bibliometric approach, especially with reference to the problem of field delineation.