Robust Trajectory Option Set planning in CTOP based on Bayesian game model

Abstract

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rations capacity to reduce en route delay, especially those caused by bad weather. This is accomplished via Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP) which has been recently developed to provide a mechanism for flight operators to communicate their route preferences for each flight via a Trajectory Option Set (TOS), as well as a mechanism for the FAA to assign the best possible route within the set of trajectories in the TOS for a given flight, i.e. the route with the lowest adjusted cost after consideration of system constraints and the requirements of all flights. The routes assigned to an airline depend not only on the TOS's for its own flights but also on the TOS's of all other flights in the CTOP, which are unknown. This paper aims to provide a detailed algorithm for the airline to design its TOS plan which is robust to the uncertainties of its competitors' TOS's. To this purpose, we model the CTOP problem as a Bayesian game, and use Linear Program (LP) to compute the security strategy in the Bayesian game model. This security strategy guarantees the airline an upper bound on the sum of the assigned times. The numerical results demonstrate the robustness of the strategy, which is not achieved by any other tested strategy.