Robert N. Johnson: Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics

Abstract

Many people believe that we ought to better ourselves. But does morality require us to do so? And if yes, what exactly does the duty of self-improvement consist in? These are two central questions of Robert Johnson’s debut book Self-Improvement. Accepting Kant’s view as a starting point, Johnson “...wants to broaden [the] defense of duty [of self-improvement] beyond Kantian premises” (12). He argues that morality requires us to adopt selfimprovement as an end and that by refusing to do it we fail ourselves morally. Taking on Kant’s taxonomy of duties, Johnson characterizes the duty of selfimprovement as an imperfect duty both regarding oneself and owed to oneself. The imperfect nature of this duty determines its scope roughly as follows. First, it implies no concrete requirements as to the kind and extent of actions one ought to perform. An individual is left to choose which ability to develop and to which extent, as long as it is rationally justified by hers life plan. Second, developed abilities should in general be responsive to the needs of fellow human beings, who will find them useful. Similarly, the content of the duty of self-improvement is twofold: it includes moral (self-control, selfrespect, conscience, etc.) and natural (mind, spirit, and body) self-development. The core structure of the book consists in consecutive reconstruction of three arguments for moral duty of self-improvement. The first argument Johnson presents appeals to the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Johnson starts with Kant’s claim that every person wills one’s own happiness as an end and that practical rationality requires that, if one wills something as an end, one necessarily wills the means to that end. Given these assumptions, it is impossible to universalize the maxim of not developing your abilities because in order for your happiness to be achieved, at least someone at some time should develop their abilities. Johnson claims that this argument is sound but it shows only that one ought to develop her abilities and not that she should adopt self-improvement as an end. Achieving the former does not necessarily imply the latter. Johnson believes that the other two arguments hit the spot. The second argument grounds the duty of self-improvement on the Formula of Humanity. Johnson holds that, because it is an end in itself, practical reason, operating through human abilities, is necessarily an end for Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2012) 15:707–708 DOI 10.1007/s10677-012-9376-1