Robert Kane's rethinking of traditional libertarian free will

Abstract

This article explores the problem of free will expecially as it is understood by libertarian philosophers. This problem becomes even more relevant in connection with the modern scientific understanding of the world which puts forward the demand of naturalism for resolving mind-body problem. The American philosopher R. Kane insists that it is necessary to rethink the traditional libertarian and compatibilist definitions of free will in order to get ahead from the standstill of current free will debates. These definitions were given their classical forms in T. Hobbes and D. Bramhall’s polemic. T. Hobbes gives a compatibilist definition of free will, i. e. of free will compatible with determinism, but only at the level of ordinary language. R. Kane suggests to pay more attention to Hobbes’ opponent, who takes into account stronger intuitions, which helps to consider related concepts, such as moral responsibility, genuine creativity, love, personal dignity, etc. in their full sense. Following the Bramhall’s tradition R. Kane expands the traditional libertarian definition of free will and shows that it is possible to make it compatible with the modern science by using such notions as «plural rationality», «self-forming acts», etc. The main task of this article is to answer why, from R. Kane’s point of view, the reduction of the traditional understanding of free will is not only unnecessary, but also harmful.