Abstract
In several contexts, such as finance and politics, people make choices that are relevant for others but irrelevant for oneself. Focusing on decision-making under risk, we compared monetary choices made for one’s own interest with choices made on behalf of an anonymous individual. Consistent with the previous literature, other-interest choices were characterized by an increased gambling propensity. We also investigated choice stochasticity, which captures how much decisions vary in similar conditions. An aspect related to choice stochasticity is how much decisions are tuned to the option values, and we found that this was higher during self-interest than during other-interest choices. This effect was observed only in individuals who reported a motivation to distribute rewards unequally, suggesting that it may (at least partially) depend on a motivation to make accurate decisions for others. Our results indicate that, during decision-making under risk, choices for other people are characterized by a decreased tuning to the values of the options, in addition to enhanced risk seeking.
Highlights
In several contexts, such as finance and politics, people make choices that are relevant for others but irrelevant for oneself
Decreased risk aversion has been observed during monetary choices made for an anonymous individual (Chakravarty et al, 2011; Hsee & Weber, 1997; Mengarelli et al, 2014; Pollai & Kirchler, 2012; Pollmann et al, 2014; but see Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2009; Reynolds et al, 2009)
We extended this literature examining the specific contributions of risk preference and choice stochasticity
Summary
In several contexts, such as finance and politics, people make choices that are relevant for others but irrelevant for oneself. In previous studies focusing on choice for the self alone, manipulation of the reward context for the self induced participants to consider the same reward amount as more valuable in a low reward context (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Louie, Khaw, & Glimcher, 2013; Martinelli, Rigoli, Dolan, & Shergill, 2018; Rigoli, Chew, Dayan, & Dolan, 2018; Rigoli, Friston, & Dolan, 2016; Rigoli, Friston, Martinelli, et al, 2016; Rigoli, Mathys, Friston, & Dolan, 2017; Rigoli, Rutledge, Chew, et al, 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, Dayan, & Dolan, 2016; Stewart, 2009; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) This implies that the fishes caught today will look better if they are more than the fishes caught yesterday. This would predict that the fishes caught today will look better if they are more than the fishes you caught yesterday, and more than the fishes another person caught yesterday
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