Rigorism and Formalism: Deciding on the Content of Universal Law

Abstract

The Universal Law formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative is often troublingfor ethicists, as different interpretations can yield significantly different moral results in individual cases. This paper addresses two of the most important contemporary interpretations of Kant’s Universal Law formulation, namely that of Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill. In the paper, Leach-Krouse argues that no satisfactory compromise between these two interpretations can be found. Specifically, the papers argues that Korsgaard’s account avoids rigorism—the over broad application of moral rules—by interpreting the Universal Law Formula as a guide to particular actions, and that O’Neill’s account avoids formalism—the failure to prohibit immoral acts—by interpreting the formula as a source of overarching rules for conduct. Leach-Krouse argues that by examining morally indifferent actions that are similar in certain ways to morally unacceptable actions, we see that there can be no acceptable midpoint of maxim-generality that avoids both formalism and rigorism.