Right for the Wrong Reason?: A New Look at the 6 June 1944 D-Day Forecast by a Neutral Swede

Abstract

AbstractThere are at least three popular perceptions surrounding the weather forecast for the D-day landing in Normandy, 6 June 1994: 1) that the Allied weather forecasters predicted a crucial break or “window of opportunity” in the unsettled weather prevailing at the time; 2) that the German meteorologists, lacking observations from the North Atlantic, failed to see this break coming and thus the invasion took the Wehrmacht by surprise; and 3) that the American forecasters, guided by a skillful analog system, predicted the favorable conditions several days ahead but got no support from their pessimistic British colleagues. This article will present evidence taken mostly from hitherto rather neglected sources of information, transcripts of the telephone discussions between the Allied forecasters and archived German weather analyses. They show that 1) the synoptic development for the invasion was not particularly well predicted and, if there was a break in the weather, it occurred for reasons other than those predicted; 2) the German forecasters were fairly well informed about the large-scale synoptic situation over most of the North Atlantic, probably thanks to decoded American analyses; and 3) from the viewpoint of a “neutral Swede,” the impression is that the American analog method might not have performed as splendidly as its adherents have claimed, but also not as badly as its critics have alleged. Finally, the D-day forecast, the discussions among the forecasters, and their briefings with the Allied command are interesting not only from a historical perspective, but also as an early and well-documented example of decision-making under meteorological uncertainty.