Richardson's Model of Arms Races: Description, Critique, and an Alternative Model

Abstract

1 We are referring to the first model presented in F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inic., 1960), Chapter II. Richardson's rivalry and submissiveness models (Ibid., pp. 35-36 and chapter IV) are mentioned briefly in this paper on p. 69. Richardson's original work was Generalized Foreign Politics (British Journal of Psychology, Monograph Supplement No. 23, 1939). review article referred to is Anatol Rapoport, Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War, Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (1957), pp. 249-299. 2 Several authors have proposed reinterpretations and generalizations of Richardson's two nation arms race model along lines complementary to the one presented here. These include Robert P. Abelson, 'Derivation' of Richardson's Equations, Joutrnal of Conflict Resolution, VII (1963), pp. 13-20; Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); M. D. Intriligator, Some Simple Models of Arms Races, General Systems, IX, pp. 143-147; and Paul Smoker, The Arms Race as an Open and Closed System, Paper delivered at the Fourth North American Peace Research Conference, Peace Research Society (International), Chicago, Illinois, November 1966. Abelson, Boulding, and Intriligator have all stressed the limitations of any model restricted to two nations and a very simplified view of decision-making. Nonetheless, they have felt the work was suggestive enough to be worth some further development. author of this paper shares these reservations and is, if anything, more pessimistic. utility of the approach is also discussed by Rapoport, op. cit., pp. 281-282, and in his more recent work