Rhetorical Trajectories of Tiananmen Square

Abstract

In April and May of 1989, the protest movement that began in Tiananmen Square, in the center of Beijing, became one of the most dramatic and defining episodes in the presidential administration of George H. W. Bush. Global media covered the events daily, feeding images around the globe of students engaged in a standoff with police and military units. While the movement began as mourning for the death of the reformer Hu Yaobang, the drama quickly took on a different character, as students turned their attention from Hu Yaobang and towards perceived failures of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and corruption. The movement ultimately culminated in the bloody military crackdown against the protesters on the night of June 3–4, 1989. As much of the world had been mesmerized by the students, immediately after the violent enforcement of martial law, global responses almost universally condemned China's ruling party, and demanded harsh action against the Chinese government. In the United States, the drama of the events provoked protests from right and left criticizing the Bush administration's response, which was seen as weak and ineffectual. Bush, however, insisted that relations with China were too critical to allow them to be destroyed over the incident. In fact, Bush said in October of 2007 that one of the most important actions of his administration was keeping the lines of communication open with the Chinese government immediately after the crackdown in Tiananmen Square, in spite of widespread opinion among the public and in Congress that China needed to be punished for the actions of the government and military. Bush indicated that had he not kept the lines of communication open, it would have taken significantly longer for China-U.S. relations to heal.1