Rewriting the Legacy of Chiang Kai-shek on the Diaoyu Islands: Chiang's Ryukyu policies from the 1930s to the 1970s

Abstract

The intensifying disputes between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands today have reminded both academia and the general public of the Ryukyu problem. Reportedly, during the Cairo Conference in 1943, Chiang Kai-shek let slip opportunities to recover the Ryukyus, which later resulted in Japanese control of the Diaoyu Islands. Until now, scholarship has maintained that Chiang narrowly missed regaining Okinawa at Cairo, which never again appeared on his agenda. However, a more nuanced historical account can be found in rarely accessed primary resources such as Chiang's diaries and presidential papers, which yield a different conclusion—that he was, in fact, committed to the Ryukyu issue throughout his political career. However, Chiang lost multiple opportunities to resolve the issue as a result of competition with his communist rival, the security dynamics of the Cold War, and his personality. Chiang eventually failed to stop America from returning the Ryukyus to Japan, which, thereafter, generated the Diaoyu Islands disputes and continues to serve as a primary source of nationalist friction today in Sino–Japanese relations.