Abstract

Abstract We consider different resource allocations of rewarding endowments in the collective-risk social dilemma, and we study their impact on the evolution of public cooperation and the accumulation of common resources in structured populations. We assume that if the accumulated resources in the common pool meet the basic demands of everybody in the group, then each group member obtains an equal basic endowment. However, if the resources in the group exceed this sum, then each group member can get an additional rewarding endowment from the common-pool resource. By means of Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the consideration of rewarding endowment is favorable for the evolution of cooperation. But the common resources may be exhausted if the rewarding is too frequent or too generous. Interestingly, we do find a parameter region in the basic endowment and the reward intensity in which cooperation is promoted whilst the common resources are maintained. We introduce a quantitative index to precisely identify this parameter region, and find that such win-win situations for the evolution of cooperation and the maintenance of common resources occur when the basic endowment is low and the reward intensity is intermediate.

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