Revisiting Williams on Integrity

Abstract

Forty years ago it would have been correct to say that integrity is a neglected topic in analytical discussions of ethics. Bernard Williams’ “A Critique of Utilitarianism” put an end to that trend.1 A large body of literature is now available on the nature of integrity.2 Williams’ early writings on integrity and character were also key factors in the turn in moral philosophy from impartial, conduct-based moral theories (Kantian deontology and consequentialism) to a focus on views that at an earlier time were described as “personalist ethics” and we now commonly classify as virtue ethics or character-focused moral theories.3 (In speaking of Williams’ ‘early writings,’ I am referring to his work prior to Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.4) Williams was not the lone voice in the shift from impartial moral theories to a central concern for character and virtue. The work of Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and the personalists were other major voices during this transition in analytic moral philosophy. Susan Wolf’s “Moral Saints” is another refinement and development of Williams’ arguments against impartial moral theories.5 Consequentialists and Kantian deontologists have articulated forceful objections to Williams’ arguments against impartial moral theories.6 His arguments have pressured defenders of impartial moral theories to find room, or explain why they do not need to make room, in the moral space of reasons for considerations of partiality.7 So, should consequentialists and deontologists now move on and address new problems? Do they have good reasons for moving on? Have they survived the trial posed by Williams’ arguments?8 I argue that Williams’ integrity-based critique of AU presents a compelling objection against that particular version of consequentialism. Contemporary defenders of AU (e.g., Peter Singer) face a decisive problem posed by one strand of Williams’ argument against AU. Williams’ integrity-based critique of AU is not a straightforward matter. Williams’ writings, like those of Wittgenstein, are often obscure but they are particularly interactive and handsomely reward return visits. His early writings in ethical theory are systematic and contain overlapping arguments that have intrinsic philosophical significance and the arguments bear on one another in ways that are easy to overlook. The task of reconstructing his critique of AU is both historically and philosophically valuable. I reconstruct his integrity-based critique of AU with an eye to showing how it criticizes AU on the grounds of both first-order normative considerations and second-order meta-ethical considerations. Section 2 reconstructs Williams’ critique of AU. In response to the arguments, some defenders of AU have argued that his conception of integrity is narcissistic and, therefore, even if AU does somehow attack Williams-style integrity, that does nothing to undermine the legitimacy or normativity of the demands of the principle of utility. Section 3 reconstructs Williams’ conception of integrity and examines a range of objections that clarify the view and reveal some its normative limitations. I contend that the charge of narcissism is unmerited.