Rethinking the Empirical in the Posthuman

Abstract

The concept ‘posthuman’ appears to imply an understanding of human being different from Descartes’ invention that helped launch the Western Enlightenment: his spectacular cogito, the knowing, epistemological subject who, through the right use of reason, can produce foundational truth. Rorty (1979) called Descartes’ approach to philosophical thinking ‘methodological solipsism’ (p. 192) because it invents and then installs a particular description of human being, the ‘I think’ and ‘I know’, ahead of the world, separate from the world. Then, in a feat of magic, this cogito invents the world — a stunning onto-epistemological project. It could be argued that such arrogance inevitably calls into existence its own resistance; and, indeed, a counter tradition in Western thought has always resisted Descartes’ knowing subject. In the 20th century, his description of human being was refused by scholars we have labelled ‘postmodern’ because of its devastating epistemological projects in the name of progress and science. Over time, to be became equated with to know, and empirical science was privileged as the superior path to true knowledge. Lyotard (1979/1984) critiqued the supremacy of scientific knowledge with his statement ‘Knowledge is not the same as science’ (p. 18), a critique supported by those whose knowledge has been deemed unscientific and then dismissed.