Abstract
Various arguments advanced in favor of deflationism force us to rethink our concept of truth. Deflationists indicate numerous problems with the standard ways of defming truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatism), and try to convince us that the concept of truth is far less interesting than philosophers usually take it to be. If deflationists are right, the perennial philosophical problems concerning the nature of truth are based on an inflated concept of truth. Their positive view is that, for any proposition (or sentence) p, a simple equivalence schema — ‘p’ is true if and only if p — captures this concept better than any traditional theory of truth. Deflationists think the schema is sufficient to describe the logical behavior of the truth-predicate and explain why it is useful to have such a device in our language1.
Published Version
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