Restitutionism

Abstract

Modem discussion of the ethics of punishment has given rise to a variety of different answers to the traditional questions as to why and how crim inals should be punished for their misdeeds. Despite the fact that anyone engaged in a consideration of these questions will thus face a poly faceted theoretical field, it is nevertheless obvious, I believe, that the more basic ingredients in the discussions have to a large extent consisted of the traditional competing positions, namely, consequentialism and retributivism. Consequentialist theories of punishment have been pre sented in versions differing with regard to which value theory is adopted or whether the theories are pure or are in some way restricted.1 Retribu tivist theories have unfolded in many ways, giving different explanations as to why a criminal deserves punishment.2 And several attempts have been made at working out hybrids between the two basic theories. Even though the traditional way of characterizing theories either in consequen tialist or retributivist terms is therefore still highly useful, it is also a fact that these categories are no longer sufficient. Modem discussion has giv en rise to brand theories. The most notable example of such a theory is probably what has be come known as restitutionism. This theory was originally presented by Randy Bamett in an article in which he, opposing consequentialism and retributivism, proposed a radical redirection of thinking about crime and punishment or, as he put it: a new paradigm of criminal justice.3 The basic idea, as we shall see, is that justice consists in making criminals compensate their victims for the damage caused. Unsurprisingly, this