Abstract
Abstract This paper is concerned with the question of whether constitutional systems that have adopted the centralised, “Kelsenian”, model of judicial review, which is prevalent in Eastern Europe, can engage in “responsive judicial review” (Dixon, 2023). It focuses on two features that can be associated with the constitutional courts created in this region after the end of communism, which, the paper argues, can significantly hamper their capacity to identify and counter democratic blockages. These are: (1) their limited standing rules that prioritise the access of political bodies to constitutional courts, and (2) the latter’s commitment to formalism, which can prevent judges from engaging with the structural and contextual issues that are causing a democratic blockage.
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