Abstract
Response: Commentary: Distrust, False Cues, and Below-Chance Deception Detection Accuracy: Commentary on Stel et al. (2020) and Further Reflections on (Un)Conscious Lie Detection From the Perspective of Truth-Default Theory.
Highlights
People often mistake other people’s deceits for truths
Based on previous evidence that (1) distrust may induce conscious thought (e.g., Mayo, 2015) and (2) conscious processes can hinder the ability to detect deception (e.g., Reinhard et al, 2013), we expected and found that participants are less accurate in judging deceits and truths when contextual distrust is induced, which was partly due to participants relying more on false beliefs about deception
Even though below-chance accuracy is less common in deception research, our findings are the result of investigating a new contextual effect in which distrust was induced
Summary
People often mistake other people’s deceits for truths (i.e., the truth bias; McCornack and Parks, 1986). Based on previous evidence that (1) distrust may induce conscious thought (e.g., Mayo, 2015) and (2) conscious processes can hinder the ability to detect deception (e.g., Reinhard et al, 2013), we expected and found that participants are less accurate in judging deceits and truths when contextual distrust (vs trust) is induced, which was partly due to participants relying more on false beliefs about deception In his commentary on Stel et al (2020), Levine (2021) agreed that (1) distrust hampers correct deception judgments and that (2) distrust involves conscious processing. Our findings that contextual distrust produced below-chance accuracy do not contradict, but supplement previous research
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