Abstract
This article examines how repression is being wielded by the Russian Federation in Crimea against Muslim Tatar communities under the guise of countering terrorism and violent extremism, and how non-violent resistance and grassroots resilience is being fostered as a means of countering securitisation. The case demonstrates how language developed within a Western security context are co-opted by authoritarian actors, how Islamic activist groups engage in activities that can be framed as ‘resilience-building’ through the language of human rights, freedom of press and democracy, and the issues raised by applying the term ‘resilience’ within a counterterrorism context—both in illiberal and liberal settings. The article finds that techniques comparable to concepts of resilience-building are being conducted in an illiberal setting by communities in response to, and as a counter against highly repressive articulations of counterterrorism. It also suggests that the term ‘resilience’ is problematic in this context, failing to adequately account for—and often actively obscuring—organisational activism of communities and their interaction with the political context. This offers an understanding of community-led responses against counterterrorism and counter-extremism as a tool of repression as well as examining the credibility of terms such as ‘resilience’ within CVE in Crimea and elsewhere.
Highlights
This article examines the interaction between Russian authorities and Crimean Tatar communities since the annexation of the peninsula by the Russian Federation
It focuses on how counterterrorism and counter-extremism has been utilised by an illiberal regime, how activists have sought to respond, and the implications this has for understanding changes in the on-going ‘War on Terror’
As Coynash and Charron explain, Russia has engaged in acts which mimic those of the United States, ‘evok[ing] threats of terrorism and extremism to justify the annexation and its exceptional use of violence in occupied Crimea’ (Coynash & Charron, 2019, p. 33)
Summary
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 gave way to repression of perceived political opponents and religious minorities in the peninsula, with counterterrorism and counter- extremism used as ‘a convenient tool of repression’ (HRW, 2019a). This has largely been achieved by charging suspects with membership of or affiliation to Hizb ut-Tahrir (‘the Party of Liberation,’ or HT), an international Islamic activist party (cf Taji-Farouki, 1996; Sinclair, 2010; Hanif, 2014, for excellent overviews of the party). This article uses empirical research from 12 anonymised interviews conducted with leading Crimean activists, human rights groups, legal practitioners and official spokes persons of Hizb ut-Tahrir Ukraine. Interviews took place in 2021 in English, Russian, and Ukrainian, and interviewee names were anonymised to guarantee research subject safety. The article explores how the language of counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) has been appropriated by an illiberal regime against political opponents, how activists use practices broadly contingent with ‘resilience-building’ against state repression and the problems of applying concepts such as resilience beyond a liberal- democratic context
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