Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between enterprise performance and the largest shareholder’s shareholding, balancing shareholder’s shareholding, and the nature of balancing shareholder by researching into mixed ownership enterprises on China’s SME board. The empirical results show as follows: when balancing shareholder exists in mixed ownership enterprises, there is a reverse U-shaped relationship between the largest shareholder’s shareholding and the enterprise performance. Otherwise, when there is no absolute controlling shareholder in mixed ownership enterprises, balancing shareholder’s shareholding presents a positive correlation of the enterprise performance; the balancing shareholder will play a better role of checks and balances when its nature is different from that of the largest shareholder. State-owned balancing shareholder has a more significant effect of checks and balances in private-controlled enterprises.

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