Research on the Bidding Behavior of Generation-Side Enterprises Based on Stochastic Evolutionary Games

Abstract

The massive access to renewable energy sources in smart grids and their inherent uncertainties have led to large fluctuations in the power market's demand margin for conventional electrical energy. Therefore, the stability of the bidding behavior on the power generation side will be affected. To describe the interference of uncertain factors on the bidding process of power generation enterprise groups, we introduce Gaussian white noise into the bidding game. Additionally, taking into account the mutual promotion or mutual inhibition between strategies within the group, we introduce strategy influence factors to improve the replicator dynamics equation. Then, a stochastic evolutionary game model is proposed and solved according to the stability judgment theorem of the stochastic differential equation. The stability and convergence speed of the traditional evolutionary game model and the proposed model are compared in the evolution process of the group strategy. The simulation results show that the strategy with the greater influence is more decisive for the direction of group evolution and the speed of evolution to a stable equilibrium point. Additionally, the proposed model can reflect fluctuations in the evolution process of decision-makers, which promotes the speed with which players evolve toward the optimal strategy.