Research on stability of major engineering technology innovation consortia based on evolutionary game theory

Abstract

Currently, major engineering projects have become increasingly complex, necessitating continuous technological innovation in response to improved social productivity. Innovation consortia, as typical organizations driving technological advancement, face challenges such as uncertain decision-making behavior and organizational instability, particularly in major engineering technology innovation consortia (METIC). This study aims to explore innovation behavior strategies and investigate the factors influencing consortium stability. Drawing from extensive literature research and practical scenarios, this paper outlines the evolutionary game problem and theoretical assumptions within METIC, focusing on the interplay between construction enterprises and research institutions. By constructing and deducing an evolutionary game model, we analyze the effects of various factors, such as the initial state, distribution coefficients of innovation income, reputation loss, and others, on the stability of innovation consortia. Additionally, we simulate the dynamic evolution process of strategy selection. Our findings reveal that evolution behavior is significantly influenced by the initial state. Furthermore, an optimal range of innovation income distribution coefficient exists, and factors like government incentives, penalties, and reputation loss positively influence the evolution towards active strategies. Conversely, factors like absorptive capacity, risk coefficient, and distrust coefficient inhibit the evolution towards active strategies. The research outcomes and managerial implications presented in this study serve as a valuable reference for enhancing the stability of METIC, thus fostering successful technological innovation and progress in major engineering projects.