Abstract

Facing the increasingly serious waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling problem, recycling enterprises actively introduce online recycling channels, build dual channel reverse supply chains (DRSC), and use high-level recycling price and service levels to enhance consumers’ recycling enthusiasm and recycling amount. Nevertheless, in China, where the imbalance of regional development is widespread, the recycling center, third-party recycler (TPR), and third-party platform (TPP) are faced with the choices of pricing and service level when facing multi-regional consumers. This paper mainly answers the following questions: (1) When the recycling center and TPP introduce online recycling channels in multi-regional situations, how should they set online recycling price, transfer price, and service level? (2) When consumer preference for online channels changes in a certain region, how should recycling enterprises adjust their optimal pricing and service level decisions for different regions to maximize their own profits? How do the profits of recycling enterprises change? In order to solve the above problems, in this paper, we propose three pricing and service level decision models for the recycling center with online channels, namely, keeping prices unchanged, unifying all prices, and maximizing its own profits. By using the Stackelberg game to solve the model, we get the optimal pricing, service level decisions, as well as the maximum profits of the recycling center, TPP, and TPR when consumer preference changes. By analyzing the results of the model, we find that the change of consumer preference for online channels in a certain region will affect the decision and profits of multi-regional recycling enterprises. Specifically, consumer preference for online channels in a certain region will not only lead to an increase in the profits of the recycling center and TPP and a decrease in the profit of local TPRs, but also an increase in the profit of TPRs in other regions. In addition, at the beginning of introducing online channels, the recycling center can adopt two strategies to avoid conflicts among channels: keeping offline transfer prices unchanged and unifying all transfer prices, but the former promotes its economic profits more significantly.

Highlights

  • Due to its great influence in solving the problems of resource shortage and environmental degradation, dual channel reverse supply chain (DRSC) has attracted much attention both in the recycling industry and in academia [1]

  • Different from previous studies, this paper studies the influence of consumer preference on the pricing and service level decisions of recycling enterprises with different pricing strategies in DRSC in multi-regional situations

  • This paper studies the influence of consumer preference on pricing and service level decisions of recycling enterprises in DRSC mode in a multi-regional situation

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Due to its great influence in solving the problems of resource shortage and environmental degradation, dual channel reverse supply chain (DRSC) has attracted much attention both in the recycling industry and in academia [1]. How to make a comprehensive decision on service level and pricing in DRSC is of great significance In this context, when consumer preference in a certain region changes, how should the recycling center, third-party platform (TPP), and TPR with different pricing strategies adjust the pricing and service level decision in the region? The main contribution of the paper includes the following points It explores the influence of the adjustment of recycling service level on the decision and profit of recycling enterprises and supply chain system in a multi-regional situation in online recycling channels. Scholars in related fields only set up models for no more than two types of enterprises considering consumer preference in multi-regional situation It compares the differences of decisions and profit trends of enterprises under three pricing decisions in the context of DRSC: keeping the offline transfer price unchanged, unifying all transfer prices, and maximizing their own profits.

Literature Review
Service Level Decisions
Description of Notations
Model Analysis
The Offline Transfer Price Is Unchanged
Unify All Transfer Prices
Maximize Its Own Profits
Numerical Example
Discussion
Conclusions
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call