Abstract
This paper investigates the contract between a FPL(fourth party logistics) and a TPL(third party logistics) inagricultural product financing. FPLs will subcontract logistics tasks to TPLs after they accept tasks from banks. TPLs’effort has a positive impact on FPLs’ profits, as well as the relationship between FPLs and banks. Thus it is importantto course TPLs to devote more effort in that work. Using principal-agency theory, we establish a multi-taskprincipal-agent model, and consider the situation with TPLs’ reciprocal preference. Results show that TPLs withreciprocal preference will invest extra effort when TPLs provide a higher reward. The stronger the sense of the TPLs’reciprocal preference is, the more the TPLs will increase extra effort, and different TPLs have different reaction whenFPLs provide the same reward. Thus, FPLs can gain more profits through designing appropriate incentive contract.
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