Abstract

To promote dual carbon targets, this study builds a heterogeneous agricultural product supply chain comprised of a green agricultural product producer, an ordinary agricultural products producer, and a retailer. This study constructs four strategic government green subsidy models, wherein the nongovernment subsidy, government subsidy for green agricultural producers, subsidy for green consumers, and dual subsidies. Based on Stackelberg’s game theory, this study analyzes the impact of differentiated green subsidies on heterogeneous agricultural product supply chain decision-making. The results show that the government will provide green subsidies only when the input cost coefficient of green quality is within a certain threshold. Consumers’ preference for green agricultural products will improve the level of green quality. The dual subsidy strategy of the government has the highest social welfare and can stimulate the motivation of green production. When considering the subsidy expenditure, the green consumer subsidy strategy can achieve a higher level of green quality and promote the consumption of green agricultural products. The government should combine different subsidy target effects and subsidy effects to provide appropriate green subsidy strategies. According to the corresponding subsidy strategy, the producers and retailers of heterogeneous agricultural products carry out green investment, reasonable pricing, and precision marketing.

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