Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to study the influence of game players’ behavior preferences on the strategy choice and equilibrium results in the game process of large-scale engineering projects’ extreme disputes. In contrast to the self-interested preference and completely rational assumptions of traditional economics, this paper focuses on the discussion of loss aversion preference and fairness preference against the background of incomplete information about the game subject. Considering the influence of the decision-makers’ multidimensional preferences, this paper establishes a three-party game model for the government, the project construction units, and the public. Furthermore, the equilibrium results of four different types of extreme disputes are deduced using the game method. We deduce the evolutionary paths and equilibrium characteristics and discuss them in combination with actual cases in China in an attempt to provide theoretical support and scientific analysis tools to avoid serious disputes and conflict decision results. Through research, this paper finds that the transformation of prior beliefs, the role of multidimensional preference sets, and a lack of information between the game players in the game process are key to the evolution of project disputes into extreme dispute decisions.
Highlights
In the process of construction management of large-scale projects, the disputes may evolve into extreme payment structure or extreme equilibrium results under the joint action of the multidimensional preferences of decision-making subjects, which are collectively referred to as extreme dispute decisions
The analysis shows that this type of equilibrium characteristic is mainly closely related to prior beliefs and loss aversion preferences, while resistance-type extreme dispute decision-making has a unique extreme payment structure because of the influence of individual behavior preferences
We summarized the equilibrium results (Supporting, Legal and reasonable operation, Acceptance) as the optimal strategy solution; the negative income (Supporting, Violation and rent-seeking operation, Resistance) is considered a retarding-type extreme dispute decision; (Supporting, Violation and rent-seeking operation, Acceptance) is a rent-seeking type extreme dispute decision; (Supporting, Legal and reasonable operation, Resistance) represents a resistance-type extreme dispute decision; and if the government chooses (Not supporting) at the beginning, this represents a zero-return type extreme dispute strategy
Summary
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Large-scale engineering projects can confer long-term benefits for a country and multidimensional project carry endogenous value and social ecological impact Their reasonable construction and normal operation can effectively promote the development of the national economy and the comprehensive national strength. Due to the complex related subjects, long construction period, and huge social impact, the large-scale projects’ decision-making process often encounters disputes, and these disputes are very likely to form extreme equilibrium results in the process of the game interaction. Game theory can absolutely scientifically analyze the dispute decision-making of large-scale engineering projects If it is based on the completely rational premise of traditional games and the subject’s single preference assumption, the game will not be able to fully explain the economic phenomena in real situations. We use basic game logic to determine the equilibrium conditions to avoid extreme dispute results
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