Abstract

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

Highlights

  • The root cause of interactive cooperation behaviors among subjects is through obtaining a higher profit to enhance their competitive advantage and ensure long-term survival and development

  • The individual’s choice has limited rationality, which can be analyzed using evolutionary game theory method. When it comes to the cooperative innovation behaviors among subjects in industrial clusters, the use of evolutionary game theory is built on the heterogeneity of the subjects and the nonlinear interaction among them, which make such cooperative innovation exhibit the characteristics of complex open systems

  • In the internal innovation system of industrial clusters, specialization and complementary resources lay the foundation for cooperative innovation among the subjects; technological innovation complexity sets a higher requirement for capital, facilities, and others in innovation activities; innovation itself becomes a complicated systematic project beyond a single body

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Summary

Introduction

The root cause of interactive cooperation behaviors among subjects is through obtaining a higher profit to enhance their competitive advantage and ensure long-term survival and development. The industrial cluster in reality can be considered as a huge complex organism consisting of individually initiative and adaptive subjects like the enterprises, government, colleges, and research institutes, as well as service mediations. The convenience that is brought out from geographical location raises the significance of the competitive effect among enterprises, major subject, and other supportive subjects in the cluster, which forms the competition-cooperation mechanism to improve the successive possibility of innovative activities. Learning is an important activity throughout the process of the competitive-cooperation mechanism It lightens the significance of the adaptive learning feature of the innovative subject.

Introduction of Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary Game Model of Cooperative Innovation in Industrial Cluster
Case Study
Conclusion
Full Text
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