Abstract

Industrial cluster theory has important guiding significance for regional industrial development and industrial agglomeration advantages. Cooperation among enterprises is the corner stone of industrial clusters. The purpose of the paper is to explore the effects of cluster informal contracts on cluster enterprises and the behavior of external partners. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the innovative cooperation among local and external cluster enterprises. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of enterprises in different situation. Furthermore, by using MATLAB software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the accuracy and reliability of the game model. Results show that, in addition to the formal market contract, effective implementations of cluster informal contracts can reduce opportunistic behavior in innovative cooperation among internal and external enterprises. Meanwhile, we should pay attention to strengthen the external innovative cooperation, increase severity of penalties, enhance the credit network externality, and avoid the relevant risks. The paper enriches our understanding about how informal contracts can help promote and cultivate good cooperative order in innovative cooperation of clusters.

Highlights

  • Nowadays, the development issues about industrial cluster is becoming increasingly compelling, as cluster development is still one of the most effective ways to increase competitiveness [1]

  • Industrial clusters have generated conducive scenarios to coopetition to compete at the global level [38]

  • The innovative contract within industrial clusters can allow a breakthrough in the geographical restrictions and use Internet technology to achieve greater cooperation and interaction, so as to find more favorable and reasonable resources to promote transformation and upgrading for traditional industrial clusters

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Summary

Introduction

The development issues about industrial cluster is becoming increasingly compelling, as cluster development is still one of the most effective ways to increase competitiveness [1]. The external enterprises are attracted to have innovative cooperation with cluster enterprises for their agglomeration of skilled personnel, availability of risk capital, favorable market, reduced transaction costs, and regional competitiveness, such as regional prestige and priorities for their agglomeration of technical talent [8, 19, 22, 23] For these external cluster enterprises, their kinship and geography relationship characteristics are unlike internal cluster enterprises. This cross-region competition can reduce transaction costs and increase innovation, but it involves risks related to opportunistic behavior and lack of trust [24, 25].

Evolutionary Game Model
Numerical Simulation and Discussions
Conclusions
Full Text
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